Peace and Conflict Studies
Volume 21

Number 1

Article 4

5-2014

After a Century of Injustice: Moving Toward Turkish Recognition
of the Armenian Genocide
Ashley Kalagian Blunt
University of Winnipeg, a.blunt@uwinnipeg.ca

Follow this and additional works at: https://nsuworks.nova.edu/pcs
Part of the Peace and Conflict Studies Commons

Recommended Citation
Blunt, Ashley Kalagian (2014) "After a Century of Injustice: Moving Toward Turkish Recognition of the
Armenian Genocide," Peace and Conflict Studies: Vol. 21 : No. 1 , Article 4.
DOI: 10.46743/1082-7307/2014.1003
Available at: https://nsuworks.nova.edu/pcs/vol21/iss1/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by
the Peace & Conflict Studies at NSUWorks. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Peace and Conflict Studies by
an authorized editor of NSUWorks. For more information,
please contact nsuworks@nova.edu.

After a Century of Injustice: Moving Toward Turkish Recognition of the Armenian
Genocide
Abstract
Nearly one hundred years have passed since the Armenian genocide, which prefaced and in some ways
encouraged the Holocaust – yet the Turkish government continues to deny the genocide and uses
political manipulation to prevent its recognition by others. The denial’s history has been one of
collaborative repression, but in recent years Turkish voices have joined with Armenians’ in the struggle for
recognition; collaborative struggle, particularly in recognition of shared history, may represent the best
chance to pressure Turkey to federally recognize the genocide. This paper explores the machinations of
the denial and its significance in the twenty-first century, as well as the consequences of the Armenian
genocide for its victims and their descendants. As a global perspective drawn from Armenian diaspora
studies demonstrates, the genocide remains a significant part of a global consciousness of panArmenian identity. This identity remains trapped as a victim of the genocide, just as the denial entraps
Turkish identity.
Keywords
Keywords: Armenian genocide, Christian populations, genocide and denial, Ottoman Empire, Russia,
Turkish government

Author Bio(s)
Ashley Kalagian Blunt completed her Master of Cultural Studies at the University of Sydney, and currently
teaches for the University of Winnipeg. She has lived and worked in Canada, South Korea, Peru, Mexico
and Australia. Her research interests include genocide, diaspora, intercultural communication, and cultural
identity. Email: a.blunt@uwinnipeg.ca

This article is available in Peace and Conflict Studies: https://nsuworks.nova.edu/pcs/vol21/iss1/4

Peace and Conflict Studies

Peace and Conflict Studies

PCS (Spring 2014) 21(1), pp. 69-84
PCS Webpage: ttp://shss.nova.edu/pcs/

After a Century of Injustice: Moving Toward Turkish Recognition of the Armenian
Genocide
Ashley Kalagian Blunt

Abstract
Nearly one hundred years have passed since the Armenian genocide, which prefaced and
in some ways encouraged the Holocaust – yet the Turkish government continues to deny
the genocide and uses political manipulation to prevent its recognition by others. The
denial’s history has been one of collaborative repression, but in recent years Turkish
voices have joined with Armenians’ in the struggle for recognition; collaborative
struggle, particularly in recognition of shared history, may represent the best chance to
pressure Turkey to federally recognize the genocide. This paper explores the
machinations of the denial and its significance in the twenty-first century, as well as the
consequences of the Armenian genocide for its victims and their descendants. As a
global perspective drawn from Armenian diaspora studies demonstrates, the genocide
remains a significant part of a global consciousness of pan-Armenian identity. This
identity remains trapped as a victim of the genocide, just as the denial entraps Turkish
identity.

Introduction
“Denial of genocide strives to reshape history into order to demonize the victims and
rehabilitate the perpetrators, and is – indeed – the final stage of genocide” (Lipstadt in
Balakian, 2003, p. 383). If we take denial to be the final phase of genocide, this means the
Armenian genocide has continued for nearly a century, as this final phase has been inherited
and continued by successive generations of Turkish politicians, whose efforts have become
more aggressive in recent decades. In turn, members of Armenian communities, in Armenia
itself, where approximately 3 million Armenians live, and in the diaspora as well, the
scattered international communities of as many as 8 million Armenians, have worked to
counter Turkey’s efforts, lobbying governments and international organizations to officially
recognize the genocide. Despite some success, the Turkish denial continues, and continues to
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have significance not solely for Armenian communities, but also all of humanity. This is
particularly true because Turkish genocide denial sets a precedent and model, following in
step with the genocide itself, which set the precedent for the Holocaust of World War II.
This article reviews the history of the Turkish government’s denial of the Armenian
genocide, including the methods and goals of the denial, and the impacts of the genocide and
the denial on Armenians worldwide. Just as it argues that there has been a collaborative
repression of historical truth, involving academics and foreign state governments, among
others, it also argues that collaborative struggle between Armenian and Turkish activists, nongovernmental organizations, and communities offers the best opportunity to achieve Armenian
genocide recognition in Turkey based on recent events and the opportunity to continue
building on their momentum.
The Armenian Genocide and Its Aftermaths
At the end of the nineteenth century, the greatly diminished Ottoman Empire was in
the final stages of its decline. The Armenians, a Christian minority in the Muslim empire,
were living on the traditional homelands they had occupied for over 2000 years. In the 1800s,
the Ottoman Empire repeatedly went to war with Russia, a Christian empire, and lost much of
its territory, including Bulgaria, Bosnia, Herzegovina (Balakian, 2003, p. 145), and the
Balkans, largely Christian populations (p. 161). In response, the Ottoman government began
to frame Christians as its enemies (p. 145). Thus, those Christians within the Ottoman Empire
came under suspicion, in particular the Armenians (p. 198), as a large part of the Armenian
community lay within Russia’s borders. Armenians in what’s now eastern Turkey suffered
increasing attacks from Turkish mobs incited by official powers, the worst of these occurring
from 1894 – 1896 (p. 5), and again in 1909 (Balakian, 1997, p. 232; Gibbons, 1917).
At the start of World War I, the Ottoman Empire aligned itself with Germany, and
using the war as a guise, the Ottoman’s new government, the Young Turk Committee for
Union and Progress, enacted a policy of genocide against the empire’s Armenian population,
as well as Assyrian (Travis, 2006), Greek and other non-Muslim communities. The genocide
officially started on April 24, 1915, when Armenian intellectuals, community and religious
leaders in Istanbul were rounded up for interrogation, torture and execution (Balakian, 1997,
p. 235). Persecution of Armenians with intent of extermination continued across Anatolia,
what it today eastern Turkey, and then in the independent Republic of Armenia as Turkish
forces continually invaded (Balakian, 1997, p. 242; 2003, p. 328). Aida Alayarian (2008) sets
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the total number of Armenian deaths at over two million, including deaths from the pogroms
and massacres that began in 1894 and continued until 1922 (p. 9).
Two key events after the genocide have had profound and lasting impact on Armenia
and Armenians. One of these was the fate of the survivors. Their homelands became eastern
Turkey: village names were changed and Armenian churches and monuments destroyed;
even today, practically no Armenians live on this land (Hovannisian, R. K., 2003, p. 275).
Some survivors fled east to what is now the Republic of Armenia, then under the protection
of the Russian Empire and soon to be part of the Soviet Union. Others escaped and attempted
to assemble the remains of their families and villages in communities scattered across the
Middle East, Europe and North America. This formed the Armenian diaspora, which may
number approximately eight million today. The population of Armenia itself is only three
million (World Bank, n.d.). Studies of the diaspora have attested to a global, pan-Armenian
identity, though, as a result of its wide dispersion, it exists in a necessarily fragmented and
heterogeneous fashion (compare Bakalian, 1993; Kaprielian-Churchill, 2005; Kirkland,
1980a, 1980b; Schwalgin, 2004; Ziemer, 2009, 2010a, 2010b). Although few studies
document the Armenian diaspora (Kaprielian-Churchill, 2005, p. xxvi), those completed
indicate this collective diasporan Armenian identity is trapped as a victim of the genocide that
created it. It is impossible to give any sense of Armenianness without serious consideration of
the genocide; it is an inevitable part of modern Armenian identity (Theriault, 2003). This is
particularly evident for the diaspora, which originally formed as a result of the genocide
(Hovannisian, R., 2003).
Examining the major studies published in English allows insight into the lasting
impact of the genocide on diasporan communities. One American study describes the
genocide as the Armenian “overarching cultural narrative” and presents some of the
difficulties that arise from limited cultural knowledge of identity due to genocide
(Manoogian, Walker, & Richards, 2007). Ethnographic fieldwork conducted in an Armenian
community in Russia has also provided key insights into Armenian diasporan-consciousness.
There, Ulrike Ziemer found that the genocide remains a significant factor influencing
Armenian identity, both in the sense of the personal family narrative as well as the diasporan
“collective identity” (2010a, p. 295). In her study of tensions between descendants of
genocide victims and recent Armenian migrants to Greece, Susanne Schwalgin (2004)
emphasizes a contrast between an imagined “pure,” pre-genocide Armenia and the presentday, impoverished, post-Soviet Republic of Armenia. This contrast is an indication that in
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many ways, the Armenian homeland of the diaspora no longer exists. In that sense Armenian
diasporan longing for “homeland” may be, particularly for the older, original diasporan
communities formed immediately after the genocide, a longing for both a place and time
before genocide.
The genocide’s other significant and long-reaching consequence is the Turkish denial,
described as “the most consistent, strident, and elaborate state-organized attempt to conceal a
record of past atrocities” (Cohen, 2001 p. 134). During and after the genocide, the Young
Turk government, and each consecutive Turkish government, claimed to be innocent of any
wrongdoing. They institutionalised an official policy of denial that began in tandem with the
genocide and continues through today (Balakian, 2003, epilogue). In Turkey, article 301 of
the Turkish penal code makes it a federal crime to mention the unrecognized genocide
because it is an insult to “Turkishness” (Alayarian, 2008, p. 137). Although the word
“genocide” did not exist until World War II, witnesses and international media described the
state-planned massacres using the same terminology that would come to define the crime
(Balakian, 2003, p. xix). Despite this, Turkey maintains its denial, and “truths that were
certain at the time … were transformed into speculation, rumours, and uncertainties” (Cohen,
2001, p. 134). Denial is a typical criminal strategy to “promote forgetting” (Herman in
Balakian 2003, p. 373). Prior to the 1970s, the denial was passive (Balakian, 2003, p. 379;
Hovannisian, G., 2010, pp. 96, 114), but it has since become increasingly widespread,
systematic and well-funded (Theriault, 2001). The Turkish government fuels the denial
internationally by political manipulation and financial incentive. Through these means it has
even gained the support of some academics (Hovannisian, R., 1997).
Denial has been described as the final phase of genocide and the desecration of
historical memory (Hovannisian, R., 1999). Framed in this sense, the Armenian genocide has
not officially ended, but is still actively carried on by Turkish government officials a century
later. The individuals who died – often after suffering malicious violence including torture
and rape (Balakian, (2003[1918]) and (Sarafin 2000[1916]) document the extreme violence
employed, a typical aspect of genocide), and their centuries of cultural existence in the
Ottoman Empire, are still under attack. This continued denial prevents Armenians from
moving on in any way from the genocide. Diasporan Armenians advocate for recognition of
the genocide often more fervently than Armenian nationals, who have been forced to move
on in some ways due to their political realities (Hovannisian, G., 2010; Judah, 2012). For
example, when diasporan Raffi Hovannisian, an Armenian American, served as foreign
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minister in the first post-Soviet Armenian government, his hard stance demanding genocide
recognition was one of the reasons President Levon Ter-Petrosyan requested his resignation
(Hovannisian, G., 2010, pp. 171-178). Thomas de Waal (2010) notes, “In October 2009,
many diaspora Armenians, mostly descendants of Genocide survivors, found themselves in
the awkward position of denouncing the Yerevan government for moving to normalize
relations with Turkey” (p. 31). Examples like these illustrate how the continued denial has
managed to cause tensions even between Armenians.
Genocide and Denial: Setting Precedents
It was the destruction of the Armenians by the Ottoman state – viewed as an internal
affair of a sovereign entity by international laws of the time – that first inspired the Polishborn lawyer Raphael Lemkin to create a framework in international law for the concept of
genocide (Power, 2007, pp. 17-19). Indeed, he created the term genocide himself. Although
he began this effort in the 1930s, while warning people with a prophetic nature of the Nazi
regime’s intentions, he failed to convince either the community of international lawmakers or
even his own family that action needed to be taken. As a result, he lost 49 of his family
members, including his parents, in the Holocaust (p. 49). He dedicated his entire life to the
creation and ratification of the genocide convention, article 2 of which defines genocide as:
any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a
national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: killing members of the group;
causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; deliberately
inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical
destruction in whole or in part; imposing measures intended to prevent births within
the group; [and] forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. (Power,
2007, p. 62)
Based on this definition, and perhaps on its adoption by the UN in 1948, while the Nazi
atrocities of WWII remained forefront in people’s minds, the Holocaust became the defining
example of what a genocide is (Akçam, 2012, p. xxix). Yet, Lemkin’s aim was to create an
international law expressly forbidding and making punishable what had happened to the
Armenians as well as the Jews.
Scholars agree that the Armenian genocide was a direct predecessor to the Holocaust, in
part because Germany, as the Ottoman ally and mentor, had German officers assisting in the
genocide (Balakian, 2003, p. 167; Coloroso, 2008; Lifton, 2003). One of the most ubiquitous
quotations now associated with the Armenian genocide is the rhetorical question Hitler posed
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prior to the Nazi invasion of Poland: “Who still talks nowadays of the extermination of the
Armenians?” (Balakian, 2003, pp. 164-165). One might imagine that this would have drawn
Armenian and Jewish survivors together in mutual support, recognition and solidarity, but this
has unfortunately not been the case. Writing in the 1970s, Armenian American Michael Arlen
witnessed both defensive Armenian and Jewish reactions to the mention of the “other”
genocide (Arlen, 1976), and in the course of my own research 35 years later, I have
encountered the same. In a detailed comparison of genocide denial strategies, eminent
Armenian historian Richard Hovannisian (1997) describes efforts to create animosity
between Armenians and Jews:
Deniers of the Armenian Genocide uphold the truth and criminality of the Holocaust
and make an appeal to keep it uncontaminated by confusing it in any way with the
hoax of a so-called Armenian genocide; deniers direct representations of their
version of the Armenian genocide to Jewish groups as well as the Israeli
government. (p. 43)
It is disappointing but not surprising that, in response, many Armenians feel historically
overshadowed by the widely recognized Holocaust despite the two events’ closely connected
narratives and their joint basis for the formation of Lemkin’s genocide convention.
The successful Turkish effort to frame the Armenian genocide as “illegitimate” to
Jewish groups is an example of Patricia Williams’ “representational force” (1998). This refers
to the ways groups are represented to each other (and the wider community) and consequently
by each other. This process results in the continual (re)creation and (re)enforcement of borders.
The Armenian genocide is represented as illegitimate, and this illegitimacy is represented as a
threat to the legitimacy of the Holocaust. As members of Jewish groups absorb this
representation, they draw distinctions between Jewish and Armenian histories, and
consequently, between people. These distinctions are recreated and passed on, strengthening
the borders. Armenian perceptions of Jewish attitudes (regardless of the reality of these
attitudes) result in mutual border building and further group differentiation. Instead of finding
common ground, differences are continually highlighted. Representational force is powerful,
dangerous and unfortunate – these negative experiences of border creation and enforcement
may discourage Armenian collaborative efforts with non-Armenian groups, even if doing so
may be the best way to achieve their goals, as I will return to later.
The Turkish government denial remains the one major distinction between the
Armenian genocide and the Holocaust (Hovannisian, 1997). The denial has become
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institutionalized (p. 44). The Turkish government’s official position is that Armenians were
safely deported to Syria and Lebanon; although “gangs” attacked some Armenians and some
local authorities acted “irresponsibly,” this “emigration” was successful (Süleyman, 2008, pp.
122-123). This type of reinterpretation of historical events is a common tactic used by
governments to “manage outrage” over actions such as genocide (Martin, 2009). The actions of
the Turkish government as recently as 1996 put their denial in sharper context. They repatriated
the remains of Ismail Enver from Tajikistan several decades after his assassination by an
Armenian. Enver was one of the three Young Turk leaders who planned and coordinated the
genocide. In Istanbul, the former Ottoman capital, he received a state burial, during which the
Turkish president described him as an important national hero and symbol (Gakavian, 1997).
This echoes the Turkish government’s state burial of Mehmed Talât on Istanbul’s Hill of
Liberty after Hitler returned his remains in 1942, 21 years after Talât’s assassination by an
Armenian genocide survivor in Berlin (Power, 2007, pp. 2, 23). In Turkey today, there remain
streets, public schools, communities, and mosques honoring Talât’s legacy (Bedrosyan, 2013).
The ultimate goal of denial is to prevent the genocide from becoming part of global
collective memory (Hovannisian, 2003, p. 2), which, as noted, is the final phase of genocide
(Lipstadt in Balakian, 2003, p. 383). Turkey has thus far achieved some success of this final
phase of genocide by using political and financial pressure to obfuscate historical fact and deter
other nations from officially recognizing the genocide. More and more nations and government
bodies have recognized the genocide, including the Council of Europe in 2001 (Armenian
Genocide Museum-Institute “International Organisations” n.d. This website contains a list of all
recognizing governments and organizations). However, Turkey pressures the United States in
particular to prevent official recognition. In 2005, an American congressional committee passed
two resolutions to officially recognise the Armenian genocide as historical fact, but the Bush
administration refused to pass the resolutions due to their military relationship with Turkey
(Coloroso, 2008, p. 189). While Barack Obama acknowledged the genocide during his
senatorial tenure, he has yet to do so as U.S. president because of America’s strategic
partnership with Turkey (Trebitsch, Schültze, & Friedler, 2009). This has a historic precedent
as well: when the United States entered World War I, it declared war against Germany but not
the Ottoman Empire, choosing to maintain relations with the Turkish government, which
ultimately weakened its position in relation to post-war justice for Armenia (Balakian, 2003,
ch. 23).

Volume 21, Number 1

75

Peace and Conflict Studies
Governments that do take action to historically preserve the genocide face Turkish
retaliation. This issue drew international media attention in 2011 when the government of
France debated a bill to criminalize denial of any officially recognized genocide – including, in
France, the Armenian genocide. In response to this, the Turkish government recalled its
ambassador and banned French military vehicles from Turkish docks and airspace while
threatening further retaliation (“Watch your words,” 2011). France had seen this before, in
2000, when they passed a bill officially recognizing the genocide; at that time, Turkey took six
months to resume diplomatic relations with France (Balakian, 2003, p. 390). Although the 2011
bill became law in France, France’s Constitutional Council later overturned it (“French court
overturns,” 2012).
Strategies of denial also manipulate academics. The Institute for Turkish Studies in the
United States – funded by the Turkish government – awards grants to academics and then
requests their involvement in political action preventing genocide recognition (Balakian, 2003,
pp. 381-385; Hovannisian, 1997, p. 42). The Turkish government also uses coercion to fuel the
denial. For example, the first major conference considering all genocides was planned in Tel
Aviv in 1982. Some speakers intended to make reference to the Armenian genocide. For that
reason, the Turkish government put so much pressure on the universities and institutes
involved, as well as the Israeli government, that it was felt that “Jewish lives … were at risk”
(Hovannisian, G., 2010, p. 122; Hovannisian, R., 1997, p. 7). Holocaust survivor and Nobel
Laureate Elie Wiesel stepped out as keynote speaker, and the conference had to be relocated.
These are examples of what Richard Hovannisian (1997) calls “the strategies of denialists,
rationalisers, relativisers, and trivialisers” (p. 52). In his comparison of the denial of the
Armenian genocide and the Holocaust, he details the identical methods of each and the equal
danger they present to academic integrity as well as human rights. Denialists conceal certain
facts, and distort and exaggerate others to make their claims convincing. To deny any genocide
proven by historical fact is to allow for the denial of them all; this behaviour creates a precedent
for future genocide denialists to exploit. Hovannisian also argues that allowing anyone to deny
the Armenian genocide, or allowing it to be forgotten by history, is collusion in ongoing
Turkish crimes (1997).
These examples of Turkish government efforts to maintain and promote the denial
speak to a collaborative repression of historical truth. This represses not only the historical facts
of violence against the Armenians, but also individual stories of Turkish and Kurdish heroism,
of individuals and families who risked their lives to help Armenians survive and escape (for
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example, see Bedrosyan, 2013). The Turkish government cannot maintain its denial alone if
others do not agree to go along with this, particularly its own citizens. Yet others continue to go
along with it. The Australian federal government, for example, has not officially recognized the
Armenian genocide. Australian history writers pay little attention to their nation’s close
connection to the genocide despite some suggestions that the Allied invasion of Gallipoli by
British, Australian and New Zealand troops on April 25, 1915 precipitated the start of the
Armenian genocide (Manne, 2011). The Allied attack likely heightened the Turkish siegementality and fueled a mania for ridding the empire of Armenians, according to historian Jay
Winter (in Balakian, 2003, p. 178). Australia’s failure to link the two events in the national
consciousness or even actively address their connection has been described as a “cult of
forgetfulness on a national scale” (W.E.H. Stanner in Manne, 2011, p. 324). This suits the
Turkish government’s purposes and maintains the genocide’s goals.
The significance and impact of Turkish denial are complex. Beyond the points
illustrated above, Henry Theriault (2003) describes four ways the denial is not only collusion of
the crime against the Armenian people, but also an extension of it. Deniers are “accessories
after the fact” by assisting those responsible in evading guilt (p. 242). Denial is also a form of
grave desecration, in the sense that writing about the genocide serves to remember those whose
graves remain unknown or whose bodies were left unburied (p. 248). Armenian identity and
culture come under attack by deniers as well, because of the genocide’s essential role in
contemporary Armenian identity – to deny the genocide is to deny a significant part of the
Armenian historical experience (p. 247). Theriault’s analysis reflects on the denial from the
Armenian point of view, but the denial has had significant impact on Turkish citizens as well.
The Turkish government’s human rights abuses include incarceration and prosecution of
journalists, writers and activists and excessive force on the part of the police, who are immune
to accountability (Human Rights Watch, n.d.). The repression of journalists, writers and
activists is the attempt to repress witnesses, alternative voices, truth, and inevitably, memory.
The denial also causes psychological harm because it is a celebration of the violent
destruction of Armenians and a further rubbing of “salt in their already gaping wounds”
(Alayarian, 2008, p. 30). In Consequences of Denial, a psychological assessment of Armenian
post-genocide trauma, Aida Alayarian details the psychological effects of the Turkish denial on
Armenians. She argues that, psychologically, the Armenian history of trauma has gone largely
unacknowledged and undiagnosed. Alayarian describes silence as a further kind of trauma
causing acute mental distress: for decades the Armenian genocide existed largely in “a kind of
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conspiracy of silence” (p. 118) which made it that much harder for Armenians to risk
stigmatisation and humiliation by speaking about it; this only began to change in the 1990s (pp.
116-119). Armenian culture is too often solely associated with the violence of the genocide,
and as a result, “the way in which they relate to their cultural origins is often influenced by
feelings associated with loss, anger and rage at having lost their culture” (p. xxviii). This point
is particularly salient for diasporans, who may be disconnected from the Armenian language
and religion and thus have little other connection to or understanding of Armenianness.
When trauma is experienced on such a mass scale and left unaddressed, it is passed
from one generation to the next. Subsequent generations can experience similar psychological
effects without the capacity to express their origins (Alayarian, 2008, p. 46). The genocide, as a
key aspect of pan-Armenian consciousness, has entrapped Armenian identity: Armenians
cannot turn away from the genocide even momentarily, but must guard it against the continued
attacks of denial. Ironically, Turkish identity is similarly trapped by the need to perpetuate the
denial; the people of Turkey would benefit from mourning the events of the genocide, as a way
of moving beyond it (Göçek, 2003).
Collaborative Struggles for Turkish Acknowledgment
The genocide is an historical event of which many Turks remain largely ignorant, a
result of successful government efforts with this intention (Akçam in Balakian, 2003, p. 375).
As part of this effort, the history of Armenians as a once-significant community within the
borders of modern Turkey has been actively erased (Hovannisian, G., 2010, p. 225). However,
in recent years there have been indications that an increasing number of Turkish citizens are
becoming aware of this history (Trebitsch, Schültze, & Friedler, 2009). A significant turning
point within Turkey was the murder of Turkish Armenian journalist and Editor, Hrant Dink,
who had written articles urging recognition of the Armenian genocide. Dink was shot outside
his Istanbul office on January 19, 2007. The killer, a seventeen-year-old “ultranationalist,”
claimed his motivation was Dink’s offense of Turkish honour (Trebitsch, Schültze, & Friedler,
2009). As the documentary Aghet – a genocide (Trebitsch, Schültze, & Friedler, 2009) depicts,
Dink’s murder sparked a demonstration march of “hundreds of thousands” of Turks wanting to
honour his efforts. The marchers carried signs reading “We are all Hrant Dink. We are all
Armenians.” A former Turkish ambassador described the march as “very unusual,” and Dink’s
daughter, Delal, said of the march,
Nobody could imagine that in Turkey, that many people would go on the street and
say “We are all Hrant Dink. We are all Armenians.” There is this public who are
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really raising their voice and, well, the state has to hear it at some point and I think
they are hearing it. (In Trebitsch, Schültze, & Friedler, 2009)
The march has since become an annual event in Istanbul. In January 2012, it grew into a
protest involving “tens of thousands of Turks” who used the occasion to contest Turkey’s
lack of media freedom and corrupt justice system (Albayrak, 2012). The willingness of some
Turkish citizens to protest may stem from an empathetic stance for the repression of Turkey’s
fourteen million Kurdish citizens and their desire for an independent or autonomous Kurdish
state (“Turkey and its rebel Kurds,” 2010). This also dates back to the end of the Ottoman
Empire, when Kurds believed in a realistic opportunity for an independent nation based on
their close relationship with the Young Turk government – a relationship so close that many
Kurds had an active role in the Armenian genocide (Hovannisian, G., 2010, pp. 225-226). It
is an irony of history that after Kurds helped rid eastern Turkey of Armenians and other
Christians, they then became subjects of Turkish repression. Now, their struggles against
Turkey’s government are also drawing attention to the historic treatment of the Armenians
and the genocide denial. Kurdish leaders in Diyarbakir, Turkey have recently issued a
recognition and apology for the role Kurdish communities played in the Armenian and
Assyrian genocides, and called on Turkish authorities to recognize the genocide and take
steps towards atonement (Akkum, 2013).
Collaboration has been a factor in some recent efforts for Turkish recognition,
particularly at the academic level. In 2000, 126 international holocaust scholars signed an
affirmation of the Armenian genocide as historical fact and published it in The New York
Times (“Centre for Holocaust,” n.d.). The Armenian Genocide Museum-Institute (n.d.)
(“Public Petitions”) also has a petition of 150 scholars and writers who condemn the denial and
urge governments and media to recognize and refer to the Armenian genocide as such. Under
the heading “Recognition,” the website for the 2009 genocide documentary Aghet – a genocide
(n.d.) lists 15 Turkish scholars who have recognized the Armenian genocide. One of these,
historian Taner Akçam, situates himself within this struggle in describing his writing as “a call
to the people of Turkey to consider the suffering inflicted in their name” (2006, p. 2). Akçam
used his access to Turkey’s state archive to publicize nationally “self-incriminating documents”
(Hovannisian, G., 2010, p. 216). In The Young Turks’ Crime Against Humanity, Akçam (2012)
uniquely draws together both Muslim Turkish historical perspectives and those of other ethnic
religious groups present during the era of the genocide, including the Ottoman Armenians (p.
xiii). Akçam and others emphasize the importance of acknowledgment of responsibility for
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mass acts of violence and hatred in order to prevent their future recurrence (Akçam, 2006, p. 2;
Coloroso, 2008).
Equally important to Akçam’s research is the fact that a Turkish historian had the desire
and courage to use official Turkish sources to further document and definitively prove the
genocide, although this has meant he is no longer able to live in Turkey (Akçam, 2006, n.p.)
and has been listed as a target for assassination by the same terrorist group that assassinated
Hrant Dink in Istanbul (Akçam, 2012, p. xii). When Akçam, together with sociologist Fatma
Müge Göçek and novelist Elif Şafak, spoke about the genocide at a University of California
conference in 2005, it was the first time Turkish professors acknowledged the genocide in an
international conference dedicated to Armenian history. Garin Hovannisian, an Armenian
American writer, described the conference as the beginning of a new movement: “Finally, an
alliance of Armenian and Turkish intellectuals was preparing to confront the original sin of
modern history” (Hovannisian, G., 2010, p. 216).
Other examples of collaborative efforts include the “Armenians, Forgive Us” campaign,
an online petition launched by 200 Turkish intellectuals, journalists, and public and cultural
figures (Abrahamyan, 2010). The petition offered acknowledgment of and apology for the
denial of what it referred to as the “Great Catastrophe.” Approximately 30,000 people signed
the petition in its first ten days online (Aghet n.d.). This seems to be an optimistic indication of
Turkish citizens’ growing awareness of their national history from perspectives beyond their
own government’s, and their willingness to acknowledge the past and push for a more honest
and reflective future.
Armenians and Turks also need to engage in dialogue, a healing strategy Alayarian
feels is essential to both groups’ ability to renounce culturally embedded hatred and “humanize
de-humanized actions” (Alayarian, 2008, p. 143). Dialogue between descendants of victims and
perpetrators is necessary to move past the trauma suffered by both (Schwab, 2004, pp. 177-95).
The Armenian diaspora can offer a “neutral” starting place for dialogue, particularly in
communities that are home to both Armenians and Turks. Susan Arpajian Jolley, a third
generation Armenian American teacher, provides an excellent example of this when she
describes the process of memoir writing she undertook with her high school class, which
included three recent Turkish immigrants (Jolley, 2004). Many organisations have also begun
creating opportunities for Turks and Armenians to meet and collaborate, such as the
international non-profit organisation Internews, which organised the creation of collaborative
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documentaries with filmmakers from both sides of the Turkish-Armenian border (“CrossBorder film,” 2012).
Theriault (2001) has warned, “Denial is becoming the inevitable future of genocide” (p.
241). The global recognition and remembrance of the Armenian genocide is an issue that has
personal significance for Armenians, but also political significance for the world community as
a human rights issue. In their identity negotiation, Armenians have to reconcile the violent
deaths of family members, neighbours and entire communities; the permanent removal of
Armenians from much of their traditional homelands; and the ongoing and virulent effort to
permanently erase those events from world history. In light of this, it seems imperative for
Armenians to continue to not only advocate for genocide recognition and Turkish admittance of
responsibility, but to consider the most effective ways of doing so, even if this may require
overcoming uncomfortable barriers such as those of representational force.
April 24, 2015 will mark the one-hundredth anniversary of the Armenian genocide. In
the lead up to this event and the commemorations themselves, Armenians and human rights
activists have the opportunity to draw increasing attention to the issue of Turkish denial. The
2013 Taksim Square protests in Istanbul were also helpful in drawing international attention to
the democratic failings of Turkey’s government and its repressive tactics against free speech.
Activists should use the opportunity to tie the protests, which began as a way to protect Gezi
Park from demolition, to the issue of Armenian repression in Turkey – Gezi Park was, for
several centuries, an Armenian cemetery, but it was destroyed in the period of Turkification
and Armenia erasure after World War I (Greenhouse, 2013). Just as during the Taksim Square
protests, Turkish activists can continue to draw attention to their government’s ongoing failures
of justice, and make genocide recognition part of this platform. Diasporans in the United States,
Europe, Australia and elsewhere would benefit by joining in solidarity with Turkish activists,
both in their home nations and in Turkey.
As Akçam and other Turkish scholars have demonstrated by working together with
Armenian scholars, a collaborative approach changes the debate from one of Turks versus
Armenians to one of repression versus human rights. Armenian diasporan communities have
many international community organizations, such as the Armenian General Benevolent Union
and the Armenian National Committee. These organizations serve their Armenian communities
and support recognition efforts, as success in recognizing countries and other state bodies, and
near success in the United States demonstrates. Turning some of these efforts specifically to
working with Turkish activists may strengthen the already growing awareness movement in
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Turkey, as demonstrated by the Armenians, Forgive Us campaign and the marches
commemorating Hrant Dink. It seems that for advocacy to finally succeed in shifting Turkish
public and government perception to bring recognition by Turkey, it needs to, at least in part,
come from within Turkey in a collaborative struggle of both victims’ and perpetrators’
descendants.
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